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The foregoing phases of motions for new trials are mostly
statutory or provided for by court rules, as, for instance, in
the federal jurisdiction, hence one must be careful in attempting to draw analogies between cases of any two jurisdictions. One hopes that South Carolina will soon have many
of the practical time-saving rules now functioning in the
federal courts.

JUDGMENTS
Sections 10-1201, 10-1213, 10-1501 to 1538, 10-1542, 7-5,
15-770 and 15-1762, should be thoroughly analyzed and their
annotations up-to-date carefully studied.
Costs Not Part of a Judgment: It should be kept in mind
that in South Carolina in a law case, as distinguished from an
equity case, costs are no part of a judgment. They shouldn't
be alleged in any pleadings as they are never in issue. They
are purely statutory and never come into the legal picture
until a law case has been finally decided; that is, by a judgment rendered, or unless a statute, such as Section 10-1537,
provides that costs shall be a part of the judgment. Then only
do costs come on the scene and if there is a dispute concerning
them, the clerk of court is the judge and it is only when he
makes an error that the trial judge comes on the scene by
way of appeal from the clerk's decision. So one shouldn't
follow the judgment forms.
Forms of Judgments: Need a judgment be in writing? In
this state, No. And when it is, no particular form is required,
but it must be intelligible and definite. Town of N. Augusta
v. Fennell (1952), 221 S. C. 112, 69 S. E. 2d 121, gives one
the rule beginning at page 115:
When the jury returned to the court room, the verdict
of guilty was delivered orally by the foreman, whereupon
the mayor, addressing the jury, asked them if their verdict was that of "Guilty". All of the jurors promptly
answered in the affirmative. This verdict was rendered
in open court, and appellant, who was represented by
his present counsel, raised no question or objection about
the verdict's not being reduced to writing.
In accordance with the common-law practice, a legal
verdict implies a published verdict, delivered orally in

court. 53 Am. Jur., See. 109, Page 700. And as stated in
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23 C. J. S., Criminal Law §1394, page 1074, "In the
absence of statute it is not essential to the validity of
a verdict that it should be written; the jury may announce it to the court by word of mouth. However, it
is proper for the jury to put their verdict in writing,
and in some jurisdictions it is required by statute that
the verdict shall be reduced to writing, although it has
been held that such a statute is directory and that, notwithstanding the statute, an oral verdict is not necessarily void."
As announced in State v. Waring, 109 S. C. 52, 95 S. E.

143, we have no statute in this state or rule of court
changing the common-law rule that verdicts in criminal
cases may be oral. The foregoing case, State v. Waring,
is cited with approval in State v. Bilton, 156 S. C. 324,
153 S. E. 269.
A verdict of a jury orally presented in open court,
properly published and assented to by the jury, is legal
and binding, although not in writing.
While we have no statute requiring that a verdict
rendered by a jury should be written or endorsed on the
warrant or indictment, the practice invariably followed
in this state is to have the verdict written on the indictment and signed by the foreman. And in order to avoid
any misapprehension, it might be well for us to say here
that we certainly do not advise or advocate a departure
from our settled custom.
When is Judgment on Pleadings *uable? It is a "drastic
procedure" but U. S. Casualty Co. v. Hiers et al. (1958),
104 S. E. 2d 561 holds that such a judgment is
S. C. -,
permissible under certain circumstances.
When is there a Judgment, and Who Signs It? There is a
marked difference between the end or purpose of the common
law action and the end or purpose of the proceeding in equity.
In the matter of the proceeding in equity the end being sought
is a determination of the issues by the judge sitting as chancellor and evidencing the same by a decree signed by the
judge and directing a party to do some particular thing or
refrain from doing some particular thing. This decree of

the judge who acts in person in signing it, when entered
upon the court records in the office of the Clerk of Court is
entitled to full faith and credit throughout the United States.
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The end of the action at law is the rendition and publication of the verdict of the jury. The judge signs nothing and
the publication of the verdict marks the end of the judicial
process and this really amounts to a fiat of state just as much
so as though it had been a proper enactment of law by the
legislature. From the time of the publication of the verdict
it is the clerk and the plaintiff, and where an execution is

issued then is added the sheriff, who proceed down an administrative corridor which began with the publication of the
verdict. See Glenn and Redden, Cases and Material on Equity,
2d edition, page 22. See Clark vs. Melton, 19 S. C. 498, 507.
Where a jury trial is waived then the judge does sign
something, that is, he signs an order for judgment and as
a rule at the time of the trial announces his judgment. From
this time on it is the officers of the court who are performing
the ministerial acts which give life to the judgment.
In default cases that are submitted to the court and do not
need the verdict of a jury, the judge likewise signs an order
for judgment.
Under Section 15-1767, the Clerk of Court is required to
keep certain books, one of which is "Court of Common Pleas
Journal." In this journal he is required to record a full account of the proceedings of the court from its opening to its
adjournment. This really amounts to a minute book (in addition to this journal the clerk is directed to keep a book
entitled "Pleadings and Judgments," in which all orders are
entered and it is customary for the clerk to keep another book
called "Minute Book," in which orders and decrees in equity
cases chiefly are recorded).
Section 10-1458 directs that upon receiving a verdict the
clerk shall make an entry in his minutes, specifying the time
and place of trial, the names of the jurors and witnesses,
and the verdict. The "minutes" referred to here are apparently the journal of the Court of Common Pleas above referred to.
Section 10-1605 indicates the next step, and that is an application on the part of the prevailing party upon notice of
five days where the attorneys do not live in the same city
or of two days where the attorneys for the parties do live in
the same city, to tax the cost and to insert the cost so taxed
in the entry of judgment.
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Section 15-1727 requires the clerk to sign officially all judgments and state the time when each is signed and entered.
By the foregoing authority and direction the clerk then,
upon motion of the attorney for the successful litigant prepares, signs, and seals a formal judgment. It is customary
for the attorney in whose favor the judgment is rendered
and upon whose motion the judgment is rendered, likewise
to sign the judgment.
However, the Act of 1839, now Section 15-1727, is "simply
directory." As declared in Hardin v. Melton (1887), 28 S. C.
38, at page 46, quoting from an earlier case:
.. . On this subject the court said: "And even as to
third parties, while the date and the official signature
of the clerk would best authenticate the judgment and
put it beyond dispute, yet as to its effect as notice, the
filing is the main matter; when entered and filed in the
proper office, its existence could be as well ascertained
without the date and signature as with them. The entering and filing are the essential facts, and whether this
had taken place at a particular time could be discovered
by an examination of the office as certainly where the
formula had not been dated and signed as if these things
had been done." And again: "The act of 1839 does not declare that judgments not dated and signed shall be void;
it simply directs the clerk to date and sign. * ** It would
be a most stringent construction to hold that because of
such omission the whole proceeding was void." And especially so, we would add, when all other requirements
had been complied with, to wit, entry in the book of Abstracts of Judgments, enrolment, etc., etc. "This we cannot suppose was the object of the act. On the contrary,
we are of opinion that the omission here was a mere
irregularity in a matter not vital to the judgment, but
simply directory to the clerk, and may be corrected at
any time" - citing Farrar'sAdministrator v. Carmichael, 1 Brev., $92; and Harrisonv. Manufacturing Company, 10 S. C., 290.
Entry of Judgments: Section 10-1541 requires the clerk to
keep "abstract of judgments." This is a book for the entry
of judgments.
Section 10-1542 states, "In this book shall be entered such
case wherein judgment may be signed, - " This section sets
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out what information is to be placed upon the abstract of
judgment.
Section 10-1543 provides for the interested attorney or the
clerk, immediately upon entering the judgment, to attach together and file the papers in the cause, such as summons,
pleadings, judgment, verdict, report, and the like. In the
creation of a judgment lien it is the entry of the judgment
upon the abstract of judgments that is essential and starts the
life of the lien and provides the legal basis for issuance of an

execution.
Under Rule 3 of the Circuit Court a judgment cannot be
entered and thereby become a lien or be the basis for issuing
an execution until five days after the rising of the court except with special leave of the court itself. And if the attorney
for the successful party desires judgment to be entered earlier
than five days after the rising of the court and can show a
good cause therefor to the Judge the court will pass the appropriate order.
If one is obtaining a judgment in a county court, one must
know his county court Act, since they vary in the several
counties. In Richland County a judgment in the county court
can be entered upon the day of its rendition, except when
based on a jury verdict. It would seem that Circuit Court
Rule 3 will apply in the latter event
The South Carolina case of Eason v. Miller and Kelley
(1880), 15 S. C. 194, shows one how necessary it is for an attorney to be present when a verdict is being published so as to
get it in proper form. If not, a judgment based thereon will
be no better than the verdict and would have to be vacated.
Forms of Verdicts in Claim and Delivery: In this connection attention is called to Sections 10-1453 and 10-1455 with
reference to the form of verdict in claim and delivery cases.
It will be seen that it is very important that the attorneys in
such a case examine the verdict as it is published to see that
it conforms to the statutory requirements. If this isn't done

there is the chance of a client's right being seriously jeopardized.
One of the most important cases under Section 10-1453 is
Wilkins v. Willimon (1924), 128 S. C. 509, 122 S. E. 503,
wherein the Court called attention to certain requirements of
the Section as being mandatory and sets forth the form which
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must be used under a given set of circumstances. Beginning
at the bottom of page 512 one finds:
It will be particularly noted that the record shows that
the plaintiff in the original proceeding "claimed the immediate delivery" of the property and gave bond according to the statute; that the Sheriff seized the property;

that the defendant exercised his right to a redelivery of
it under Section 474 and was in possession of it at the
time of the trial. This is important, as will be seen, in
determining the proper form of verdict and judgment,
under these circumstances, in the event that the plaintiff
prevails before the jury, in the original claim and delivery action.
Sections 542 [now Section 10-1453] and 600 [now Section 10-2516] of the Code must not be confused. The one
regulates the form of the verdict in claim and delivery;
the other the form of the judgment; the one is mandatory; the other directory and optional, as the circumstances may require. The form of the verdict and the
form of the judgment vary according to the proceedings
which may have been taken in reference to the possession
of the property and to the conclusion arrived at by the
jury upon the merits of the case.
The record in a case of claim and delivery will necessarily show: (1) That the plaintiff has given bond and
secured possession of the property, retaining the same,
the defendant not having exercised his right of redelivery
under Section 474, but by his answer claiming a return of
the property; or (2) that the plaintiff has not given bond
and thereby secured possession of the property, the same
remaining in the possession of the defendant; or (3)
that the plaintiff has given bond and the defendant has
secured a return of the property from the Sheriff under
Section 474.
Condition 1: Where the plaintiff has given bond and
secured the possession of the property, retaining the
same, the defendant not having exercised his right of redelivery under Section 474, but by his answer claiming
a return of the property.
Whether the verdict be in favor of the plaintiff or
of the defendant, Section 542, is mandatory, that "the
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jury shall assess the value of the property." A verdict,
therefore, in favor of the plaintiff, should be:
"We find for the plaintiff the right to the possession
of the property described in the complaint, the value of
which is assessed at ($-) dollars, together with
($-)
dollars damages for the wrongful detention
thereof by the defendant" (if such damages be alleged
and proved).
Under Section 600 the judgment entered upon this verdict should conform to the verdict.
A verdict for the defendant should be:
"We find for the defendant the recovery of the possession of the property described in the complaint, the value
of which is assessed at ($
) dollars, together
with ($) dollars damages for the wrongful taking and detention thereof by the plaintiff" (if such
damages be alleged and proved).
Under Section 600, the judgment entered upon this
verdict should be:
"That the defendant recover of the plaintiff the possession of the property described in the complaint, or in case
delivery cannot be had for its value ($
) dollars,
together with ($
) dollars damages for the
wrongful taking and detention thereof by the plaintiff."
[Cases cited.]
Condition 2: Where the plaintiff has not given bond
and thereby secured possession of the property, the same
remaining in the possession of the defendant.

If the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff, Section 542 is mandatory that "the jury shall assess the
value of which is assessed at ($) dollars, together with ($) dollars damages for the wrongful detention thereof by the defendant" (if such damages
be alleged and proved).
Under Section 600, the judgment entered upon this
verdict should be:
"That the plaintiff recover of the defendant the possession of the property described in the complaint, or in
case a delivery thereof cannot be had, for its value
($
) dollars, together with ($
-)
dollars
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damages for the wrongful detention thereof by the defendant." Bossard v. Vaughn, 68 S. C., 96; 46 S. E., 523.
If the verdict should be in favor of the defendant,
it appears from the case of Finley v. Cudd, 42 S. C. 121;
20 S. E., 32, that under these circumstances it would not
be necessary for the jury to assess the value of the property, and that a verdict in this form would be sufficient:
"We find for the defendant the right to the possession
of the property described in the complaint"; the property
always having been in the possession of the defendant no
damages could be allowed for taking or detention. Under
Section 600 the judgment entered upon this verdict should
conform to the verdict.
Condition 3: Where the plaintiff has given bond, and
the defendant has secured a return of the property from
the Sheriff under Section 474.
If the verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff, Section 542 is mandatory that "the jury shall assess the
value of the property," and in such case the verdict
should be:
"We find for the plaintiff the recovery of the possession of the property described in the complaint, the value
) dollars, together
of which is assessed at ($
) dollars damages for the wrongful dewith ($
tention thereof by the defendant" (if such damages be
alleged and proved).
Under Section 600 the judgment entered upon this verdict should be:
"That the plaintiff recover of the defendant the possession of the property described in the complaint, or in case
)
a delivery thereof cannot be had, for its value ($
for
the
damages
dollars
)
($-with
together
dollars,
wrongful detention thereof by the defendant." Bossard
v. Vaughn, 68 S.C., 96; 46 S.E., 523.
If the verdict should be in favor of the defendant, it
appears from the case of Finley v. Cudd, 42 S. C., 121;
20 S.E., 32, that under these circumstances it would not
be necessary for the jury to assess the value of the property, and that a verdict in this form would be sufficient:
"We find for the defendant the right to the possession
of the property described in the complaint, together with
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($
) dollars damages for the wrongful taking of
the property by the plaintiff."
Under Section 600 the judgment should conform to the
verdict. As a matter of course if the verdict should embrace a part only of the property described in the complaint, the necessary changes in the forms of verdict and
judgment indicated should be made. Where the defendant
interposes a counterclaim, the proceeding under Section
542, second subdivision, [now Section 10-1455], will be
had.
Vacating a judgment: Under Section 10-1213 this must
be done within a year unless the judgment is void. In the
latter event it can be vacated at any time, even on the court's
own motion. But it seems that one has to go back to the trial
court to have it vacated and also to have it stricken from the
Abstract of Judgments if it has been entered thereon. And
such vacating can now be done at chambers, regardless of

the erroneous annotation under Section 10-1213. See Section
15-233 which also has erroneous annotations as to judge's
powers.
Usually a mistake of law cannot be the basis for relief
against a judgment, but after all it depends on the circumstances. As said in Savage v. Cannon (1944), 204 S. C. 473,
0 S. E. 2d 70, at page 476:
In order to prevail on a motion to vacate a judgment
under Section 495 of the Code, the mover must show (1)
that the judgment was taken against him "through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect";
and (2) that he has a meritorious defense. Gaskins v.
California Insurance Co., 195 S. C., 376, 11 S. E. (2d),
436. Appellant contends that respondent has failed to
meet either of these requirements. We shall discuss them
in the order stated.
As to the first requirement, appellant states that the
erroneous belief of defendant's attorney that the time for
answering was extended by a demand for an itemized
statement of account, was an error of law and not an
error of fact. It is argued that the rule in this State is
that the provisions of Section 495 [Sections 10-609 and
10-1213] of the Code apply only to mistakes of fact, not to
mistakes of law. As a general rule this is true. Lucas v.
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North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co., 184 S. C.,
119, 191 S. E., 711; Anderson v. Toledo Scale Co., 192
S. C., 300, 6 S. E. (2d), 465. But relief has been granted,
although the mistake might be termed one of law, rather
than of fact, where the litigant uses due diligence in
employing counsel, who took prompt steps to protect the
interests of his client according to what he conceived to
be the proper practice, but allowed his client to get in
default through a mistake as to the proper procedure.
The court further said at page 477, quoting from Johnson
v. Finger:
"While it is important that the statutes and rules of
court which are designed to promote the speedy and orderly determination of causes should be complied with, it
must not be forgotten that their purpose is to aid the
administration of justice; and they should not be applied
so as to defeat it. Of course, a party who is wilfully or
inexcusably in default, or one who gets himself into that
predicament by resorting to technical and dilatory practice or motions without merit and for the purpose of
hindering and delaying the opposite party in bringing
the cause to a hearing on the merits, deserves no consideration from the court.
The opinion finally determined on page 480:
In conclusion, we see no abuse of discretion on the part
of the Circuit Judge. On the contrary, we think his discretion was properly exercised. As stated by the Court in
Gaskins v. California Insurance Co., supra, the power
given to the Courts to grant relief by the section of the
Code under consideration should be exercised "in the same
spirit in which the Code section was designed, - in furtherance of justice and in order that cases may be tried
and disposed of upon their merits."
The relief provided by Section 10-1213 is exclusive and
where there is lack of due diligence by a party resulting in a
default judgment even this relief is of no avail. Brock v.
Brock (1954), 225 S. C. 261, 265, 267; 81 S. E. 2d 898.
Amendment of judgment: In this State a judge can always
correct a mere clerical error, even after the court term has
ended and upon an ex parte motion, and possibly upon the
judge's own motion. But if not clerical, there must be a
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notice and a hearing. Chafee and Co. v. Rainey (1883), 21
S.C.11.
As Justice McIver said at page 17:
"*** It is, nevertheless, to be observed, that it is a principle of the court, that no alteration can be made in a
decree on motion without a rehearing, except in a matter
of clerical error or of form, or where the matter to be
inserted is clearly consequential on the directions already
given.
It is said, however, that even granting the power to
make the correction, it could not be exercised upon a
mere ex parte motion without notice to the adverse party.
Where the error corrected is purely clerical, as in this
case, we can conceive of no reason why notice should be
given to the adverse party. It is a matter solely for the

consideration of the judge who committed the error. And
what light the adverse party, if notified, could throw
upon the question, whether the error complained of is a
clerical error, we do not readily perceive ....
South Carolina hasn't said as yet that, if after term time, it
should be done only on notice to the adverse party. For such

clerical error an amendment can be made, even after execution and 11 years after a judgment has been rendered. Huggins v. Oliver (1883), 21 S. C. 147. That case declared at
page 155:
The plaintiffs contend that the defects in the judgment
and execution amounted to more than mere irregularities
and made them void, or at least that they furnished no
sufficient authority for the sale of the land of the intestate; and that the order of the Circuit Judge granting
leave to amend, not having been made upon the motion
of a party to the action in which the judgment was recovered, within a reasonable time, was without authority
of law, and too late to effect the title to the land sold
under such judgment. We think the following authorities
show that these positions cannot be maintained:
D'Urphey v. Nelson, 1 Brev., 289; Hubbell v. Fogartie,
1 Hill, 167 [26 Am. Dec. 163]; Giles v. Pratt, 1 Hill, 239
[26 Am. Dec. 170] recognized as late as 1866 in Ashmore v. Charles, 14 Rich., 65. In D'Urphey v. Nelson, an
amendment similar to the one made in this case was sug-

gested by the court itself in the opinion granting a new
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trial. And in Giles v. Pratt a similar amendment was
allowed at the trial term of the action brought by the purchaser at sheriff's sale to recover the land twelve years
after the judgment was recovered, and upwards of eleven
years after the sheriff's sale, the judgment having been
recovered in October, 1820, the sheriff's deed being dated
April 14, 1821, and the trial having taken place at fall
term, 1832. As is said in Hubbell v. Fogartie: "It is every
day's practice to permit judgments and executions to be
amended according to the right of the case, even after a
sale under execution;" and these remarks are substantially repeated in Giles v. Pratt.
See Williams v. Ulmer (1906), 73 S. C. 579, 53 S. E. 999,
for what is not a clerical error.
Mudgments by Consent: Such judgments and decrees are
recognized in South Carolina. Weathersbee v. Weathersbee
(1908), 82 S. C. 4, 62 S. E. 838, holds:
... Title IV, which embraces sec. 144 [10-301, 1952 Code]
uses the words, 'place of trial' as synonymous with venue.
The place of the trial is the place where the action is
brought, and where the record is preserved for the guidance of those who may be interested in land titles. The
same statute directs how the venue may be changed from
one county to another, and the record transferred thither.
Until the record has been thus transferred, the trial is
deemed to be had in the county named in the summons.
In the instance under review, the place of the trial has
always been in Barnwell, and the record is now there
and has always been. The 'hearing' was only had in Bamberg, for the convenience of the parties, or their attorney.
To conclude that the mere hearing of a cause across a
county line would invalidate a judgment would be hazardous, and make the statute law an unreasonable thing. And
if the letter of the record must be appealed to, it does
not disclose that the 'hearing' was had at Bamberg, but
only in the 'signing'. A Circuit Judge often hears in one
county and signs in another county, a practice justified
by necessity and by the decisions.
See also Smith v. Lowery (1900), 56 S. C. 493, 35 S. E. 129.
An attorney, however, should be very careful as to obtaining
his client's permission if he is to consent as attorney. It is
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best, when possible, to have the client consent in writing or
orally in open court, or in writing at the bottom of the judgment or decree. As to a court's power over judgments by
consent, see last paragraph under next topic.
Judgment by Confession Without Action: It should be noted
that South Carolina has done away with the old common law
warrant of attorney. Otis Mills & Co. v. Dickson Mills (1849),
6 Rich. 487, 492. Sections 10-1533 to 1538 now regulate
judgments by confession, and it is significant that the defendant himself must make a written statement under oath containing the necessary data required by Sec. 10-1536. Also,
the clerk not a judge, or magistrate, endorses the judgment on
the statement.
As to a court's power over judgments by confession, South
Carolina would most likely follow the general rule as laid down
in Sunderland v. Braun Packing Co. (1912), 119 Ind. 125, 86
Atl. 126 2d, that such power is unlimited. By comparison it
should be noted that such power is limited with regard to
judgments by consent which are really contracts of the parties
allowed by the court to be recorded to have the force and effect
of a judgment. Hence, they can't be modified or corrected
without consent of the parties. They can, of course, be vacated

for fraud or mutual mistake of fact. South Carolina would
probably follow this general rule also.
Agreed Case: This is purely statutory. See Sections 101201 and 10-1514. One of its most important features is that
the parties and not the attorneys agree on the factual case.
No action is necessary, thus eliminating all pleadings and incidental judicial steps. Bradford v. Buchanan (1893), 39 S.
C. 237, 17 S. E. 501, at page 242, interprets Sections 10-1201
(formerly 374) as follows:
It was admitted that at the trial "the scope of the
...
action was enlarged, and the entire tract of 325 acres was
brought into the controversy by the counsel" of the parties "agreeing upon a statement of facts." But that could
not be done simply by an agreement of counsel. Section
374 of the Code declares, that in submitting a controversy
without action, "the parties to a matter in dispute may,
without action, agree upon a case containing the facts
upon which the controversy depends," &c. This court has
lately decided in more than one case, that this cannot
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be done simply by an agreement of the counsel engaged.
It may be said that the parties here, having confidence
in their counsel, made no objection. This we do not controvert; but that is not enough. The record must show
that the parties themselves signed the submission and
agreed to the change of issue, so as to make the judgment
binding upon them. This is not a mere formal technical
matter, but touches the very root of the jurisdiction of the
court.....
It is interesting to note that this Sec. 10-1537 provides
for attorney fees to be added to the judgment as "costs" and
that this is one of the two instances in which there is a provision for the allowance of attorney fees in so far as the
Statutes of South Carolina are concerned. The other incidence
is the provision for allowance of attorney fees in all partition
proceedings now appearing as Sec. 10-2211.
Of course, there are statutory provisions for the payment
of attorney fees in the United States Statutes. While we are
on this subject (without going into federal statutory provisions for payment of attorney fees) it is further interesting
to note that there are circumstances under which a court
of equity will allow attorney fees as permissible costs. These
are exceptional cases, for the general rule is that each party
must pay his own attorney; and under this general rule, if an
attorney is to be paid, it is to come as a result of contract
with his client, expressed or implied.
The courts, cf course, are interested in an attorney being
paid for his services; however, (where an attorney is representing one or the other of the parties) in a domestic relations
case, where the parties have not become reconciled and are
back together, it is the advice of the courts to the attorneys
involved not to disturb this reunited situation by pursuing
claims for attorney fees and in reality they should pick up
their papers and briefcases and quietly slip away.
As pointed out in Nimmons v. Stewart (1880), 13 S. C. 445
at page 447:
The code of procedure repealed the laws in force at its
adoption, upon the subject of costs, and changed the principle upon which they are allowed, but at the same time
it provides "additional allowances in any action for the
partition of real property." Gen. Stat. 651, § 334. The
recent act altering the code as to costs, does not affect
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this question. It has been held that these provisions, in
the New York code, do not affect the equitable power
of the court to grant counsel fees out of a common fund
belonging to the parties, as part of the relief which should
be given on the final disposition of the cause. Hotaling
v. Marsh, 14 Abb. 161; 3 Wait's Pr. 494.
This was a proceeding in equity. Whether regarded as
instituted by Hester Nimmons, as trustee, to raise the
fund charged on the land for the support of her cestui

que trust, Mary, or as heir-at-law of Isaac Anderson, for
partition of the land, she was successful in both aspects
of the action, and her expenses in having the proceedings

conducted should be reimbursed either out of the interest
for the support of Mary, or the proceeds of the sale under
the prayer for partition. Certainly the whole expenses
should not be thrown upon the interest set apart for the
support of Mary. * * *
See also Hubbardv. The CamperdownMills (1886), 25 S. C.
496, wherein it was declared at page 503:
As to the fee of Messrs. T. Q. and A. H. Donaldson,
as attorneys for the Camperdown Mills and for the receiver, we think it was properly chargeable on the fund
in the hands of the receiver. The corporation was a necessary party to the action, and as such had a right to employ and did employ these gentlemen as their attorneys,
and certainly the assets of the corporation, now represented by the fund in the hands of the receiver, should
be applied to the payment of such services as these gentlemen rendered as attorneys of the corporation. The authorities cited in the argument for these respondents
fully show that the counsel fees of the receiver are properly chargeable on the funds in his hands. The receiver
has a right to employ counsel to advise him as to the management of the property placed in his hands and as to his
duties in the premises; and in this case judging from the
expeditious manner in which this large business had been
wound up, apparently to the satisfaction of all parties

concerned, the receiver must have been well advised, and
his counsel should be well paid for their services. * * *
See also petition of Crum in the case of Johnson v. Williams (1940), 196 S. C. 528, 14 S. E. (2d) 21, wherein it
was stated at page 531:
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A review of the authorities shows that a Court exercising equitable jurisdiction may make an allowance of a
reasonable fee out of the common fund or property created or preserved, for an attorney representing a party
who, at his own expense, has maintained a suit for the
recovery, preservation, protection, or increase of a common fund or common property, or has created or brought
into Court a fund in which others are entitled to share.

Another feature which is mandatory is that the affidavit
that "the controversy is real, and the proceedings in good
faith" should be sworn to by the party and not by his attorney.
In Reeder v. Workman (1892), 37 S. C. 413, 16 S. E. 187, at
page 415, it is declared:
We are met in limine with the question of jurisdiction.
This question may be raised at any time during the trial
of a case. State v. Penny, 19 S. C., 223. Unlike other
questions, it may be raised for the first time in this
court. Bell v. Fludd, 28 S. C., 315; Hardin v. Trimmier,
30 Id., 393. And the court, sua sponte, may raise it. Pool
v. Brown, 12 S. C., 557. The case as brought in the Circuit Court was not an ordinary civil action, but was, to
say the most for it, an attempt to submit a controversy
without action for the determination of the Court of
Common Pleas for Newberry County. Provision is made
for the settlement of legal disputes in this way, and the
law of such cases is contained in sections 374, 375, and
376 of the Code. It being, however, an extraordinary
method of determining rights, the provisions of the statute must be strictly conformed to, in order to bind the
parties or to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
In the matter of submitting a controversy without
...
action, the provision is that the parties may without action agree upon a case, &c., and present a submission of
the same to any court which would have jurisdiction if

an action had been brought. The question arises for
the first time in this State, but the practice in New York
is for the parties to sign the agreement. Hobart College
v. Fitzhugh, 27 N. Y. (13 Smith), 134. It should certainly
appear in some way that the parties have bound themselves by the agreement, and are to be bound by the decision, and not, as in this case, come afterwards and repudiate the whole proceedings. ....
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It is further declared on page 416 as to the necessary affidavit:
Section 374 further provides as follows: "But it must
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real and the
proceedings in good faith, to determine the rights of the
parties." This provision is mandatory. There was no
such affidavit. It is only after it is in some way made
to appear by the act of the parties themselves that they
have agreed upon a case upon which the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same, &c., and
shall have made it to appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and the proceedings in good faith, &c., that
"The court shall thereupon hear and determine the case,"
&c. This being the construction we feel required to place
upon the section of the Code under consideration, our

conclusion is that the case, as submitted to the court below, was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of
the parties to the assumed controversy. ....

Default Judgments: The following Sections with up-to-date
annotations should be read: 10-1531 and 10-1532. (Compare
Sections 586 of 1942 Code) 10-1507, 15-233, 10-648 and
10-1213.
Prior to 1953 an itemized and verified statement of account
was mandatory. But Jordanv. Tadlock (1953), 223 S. C. 326,
75 S. E. 2d 691, joined the national trend in holding that substantial compliance is sufficient and hence a verified complaint with account attached and made a part thereof satisfied the Code Section. The annotated case of Roberts v.
Pawley (1897), 50 S. C. 491, 27 S. E. 914, is not now the law
in this regard. As said in Jordan v. Tadlock, supra, at page
330:
Although respondent has not literally followed the
terms of section 10-1531, there has been substantial compliance therewith which is sufficient. The statement of
account is attached to the complaint, made a part thereof
by appropriate allegation, and the complaint is verified
by respondent before a notary public.
In the last paragraph of the Section 10-1531 "shall" has
been changed to "may" by judicial sanction and it is now
only directory that the order for judgment be "endorsed upon
or attached to the complaint." However, to do so is the safer
course as the order is less likely to be misplaced or lost.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1959

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 5 [1959], Art. 19
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 11

So as to clearly understand the annotation to Section 101531 regarding Nettles v. McMillan Petroleum Corp. (1946),
208 S. C. 81, 37 S. E. 2d 134, and also the effect of several
later cases mentioned below, it should be noted that Sections
10-1531 and 1532 were both parts of Section 586 of the 1942
Code. On May 29, 1939, an act was approved amending that
Section, which was then Section 586 of the 1932 Code,
and giving the court power to hear evidence in default
cases in term time or at chambers. In that same year, the
Nettles tort case of slander was begun. The demand was unliquidated. However, being an unliquidated tort case, it was
held that the judge had no power to hear it without a jury.
The next case was Arthur v. Devaux (1950), 217 S. C. 256,
60 S. E. 2d 590. It was on an open account not verified. The
Judge heard evidence at chambers in accordance with the

amendment of 1939. It was held that he had that power, and
the court appears to have restricted it to contract cases only.
As a result, the Act of 1953 (Acts of 1953, page 137) was
passed giving the trial judges such power over both contract
and tort cases, whether the demand be liquidated or unliquidated. There is no decision as of now directly applying this
Act, but the Patrickcase, post, reaffirmed the Nettles case and
applied the rule therein to a like situation then before the
Court. As dictum, but in language that leaves no doubt and is
persuasive in argument, the Court said that the Act of 1953,
which was not then applicable to the situation before it,
henceforth clearly gave the trial judge power to take evidence
without a jury in term time or at chambers in both tort and
contract default cases, whether liquidated or unliquidated. So,
after a decade and a half of more or less confusion there was
clarity at last, and a very important step was made in saving
time and expense.
As to the change made in default cases concerning a judge's
power by the Act of 1953, Patrick v. Wolowek (1954), 225
S. C. 180, 81 S. E. 2d 717 explains at page 186:
The Legislature, recognizing that under the existing
law where the defendant had failed to answer, demur or
otherwise plead to a complaint in actions in tort, and unliquidated damages are sought, it was necessary to have
a jury pass upon the amount of damages, amended Section 10-1532 of the Code of 1952 by Act approved March
27, 1953, 48 St. at. Large, p. 137, so as to include actions
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in tort and unliquidated damages in the rendition of
judgments by default by a Judge of the Court of Common
Pleas without the aid of a jury.
Vacating a Default Judgment: In a motion to vacate a default judgment certain conditions are to be met in the discretion of the Circuit (or County) Judge. In applying Section
10-1213 it was declared in Jenkins et al. v. Jones (1946), 208
S. C. 421, 38 S. E. 2d 255, at page 423:
"The power conferred upon courts to relieve parties
from judgment taken against them by reason of their
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect
should be exercised by them in the same liberal spirit
in which the Code section was designed - in furtherance of justice and in order that cases may be tried and

disposed of upon their merits". Ex Parte Union Mfg.
& Powers Co., 81 S. C., 265, 62 S. E., 259, 128 Am. St.
Rep., 908. "When therefor (sic) a party makes a showing
of such mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, applies promptly for relief, after he has notice of
the judgment, shows by his affidavit that prima facie
he has a meritorious defense, and that he makes the application in good faith, a Court should not hesitate to set
aside the default and allow him to serve an answer upon
such terms as may be just under all the circumstances
of the cases." Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C., 473, 30 S. E.
(2d), 70. Gaskins v. California Ins. Co., 195 S. C., 376,
11 S. E. (2d), 436.
At page 427 it is further stated:
... The Court does not attempt, on motions of this kind,
to decide the case on its merits, but only decides whether
a prima facie showing has been made of a meritorious
defense. A very short delay will be had by setting aside
the judgment taken in this cause as it is a matter that
can be disposed of at Chambers and does not require the
Court to be in session when it is decided on its merits.
If there is merit in the Plaintiffs' case and if they can
present the evidence entitling them to a judgment as
against any evidence that might be put forth by the De-

fendant under this defense, only justice would have been
done for the Defendant would then have had his day in
Court.
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"In order to disturb or reverse the ruling of the Circuit Judge in matters of this kind, it is necessary to
make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, the Statute rests the granting of such a motion in the discretion
of the Circuit Court and the exercise of this is conclusive
unless it is patently wrong or, as has been sometimes unhappily phrased, unless the Court has abused its discretion." Duncan v. Duncan, 93 S. C., 496, 76 S. E., 1099.
See also Simon v. Flowers (1957), __ S. C., -, 99 S. E. 2d
391.
When is Default Judgment Appealable and When Void:
Both these questions are answered in Gadsden v. FertilizerCo.
(1911), 89 S. C. 483, 72 S. E. 15 at page 487:
The defendant appeals both from the order refusing
its motion and also from the judgment. Ordinarily, no
appeal lies from a judgment by default. Odom v. Burch,
52 S. C. 305, 29 S. E. 26. But where the defect in the
judgment is radical, - that is, one which goes to the
foundation of plaintiff's cause of action, or to the authority of the Court to render the judgment, it may
be remedied by appeal. . . . The authorities, with practical unanimity, agree that a default admits only what
has been pleaded, and that it does not forfeit or effect
the rights of a defendant, except as to matters necessarily
admitted by the default. 23 Cyc. 571. Therefore, if the
complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, any judgment thereon, except one of dismissal, goes beyond the allegations of the complaint; and
so, if the complaint states facts which entitled plaintiff
only to a certain kind of relief, or to relief only to a certain extent, a judgment by default which gives a different
kind of relief, or relief to a greater extent is without authority of law and cannot be sustained.
Note: The foregoing case is now out-moded in one respect
by the Act of 1953, amending Section 10-1532, which gave
the judge of a circuit or county court the power to try without
a jury default actions in contract and tort actions involving
damages whether liquidated or unliquidated. See in this connection the Patrick case, supra.
Rule as to Attorney's and Clerk's Duty: When obtaining an
order for a default judgment, care must be taken to follow
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circuit (county) court rule 15, not only by the attorney obtaining same but by the clerk in entering it.
Papers that Should be Ready for Obtaining a Default Judgment: The following necessary papers should always be prepared for presenting to the judge:
(1) Affidavit of attorney of no answer, etc. The following
form is suggested:

State of South Carolina

_In-

Court

County of

1

John Doe,
Plaintiff
vs.
Richard Roe,
Defendant

Affidavit of default.

, plaintiff's atPersonally appeared
torney, who being duly sworn says that no answer, demurrer
or notice of appearance has been received or served in pursuance to the summons.

Sworn to and subscribed
before me this
of

-day

(L.S.)
19-Notary Public for S. C.

(2) The next paper to have ready to hand to the judge is
the order of default. The following form is sugested:
Use the same caption as with the above affidavit, except
that "Order for Default Judgment" is substituted on the right
in place of "Affidavit of Default." The body of the Order
will be:
It appearing that service of the summons and complaint

was made on the defendant on the-day of

19_,

., dated
as shown by return of service of19-, and no answer, notice of
the--day ofappearance or demurrer having been served,
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IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff have judgment against
the defendant for Nine Hundred ($900.00) Dollars, and that
judgment be entered immediately.

_,

Presiding Judge
19._

The judge's order should always recite the jurisdictional
fact of proper service, as indicated above, so that it will be a

part of the judicial record.
If there is no desire to obtain leave to by-pass Circuit Court
Rule 3, then above form should have a period after the word
"Dollars", and the last sentence be omitted. If, however, such
leave is to be asked for, one must be prepared with affidavit
or witness or both so as to make a proper showing why one's
judgment lien or right to issue an execution should be placed
ahead of other judgments of that term. Rule 3 does not apply
in full force to all county courts, hence the necessity of knowing each county court's Sections in the Code. For example,
as to the Richland County Court Section 15-766 doesn't require
the application of Rule 3 unless there has been a jury verdict.
Attention is also called to the fact that "Attorney's Disbursements" are only such statutory costs or fees as have been
paid in advance to clerk or sheriff, and to others not officers
of the court, and to which the attorney would be entitled to
reimbursement. In the meantime an entered judgment would
be a protective security for same. See Cureton v. Westfield
(1886), 24 S. C. 457. However that decision leaves one in
some doubt as to when, if at all, costs paid in advance to
clerks and sheriffs are really disbursements.
Attorneys should always be familiar with Section 10-472,
which provides that no costs or disbursements for serving any
process can be taxed against the losing party in a case unless
such process is served through the sheriff's office.
Summary Judgment: South Carolina has no Summary
Judgment. The nearest this state comes to that kind of judicial step is by Section 10-654 and Section 10-1505. The former provides for striking out sham or false defenses; the lat-

ter for adjudging a demurrer, answer or reply as frivolous.
It used to be in this state that upon the decision of either
motion one could not get a default right then but had to
await a jury term of court. Now under Section 15-233 which
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gives a judge such broad powers at chambers a default judgment can be obtained at once. Even before that broad power
was given, the judicial tendency was to allow for judgment
at once in open court when an answer was stricken as sham.

Interstate Chemical Corp. v. Farmington Corp. (1915), 100
S. C. 196, 84 S. E. 710.
Scope of Default Judgment: Code Section 10-1506 states
the rule in South Carolina as to the relief to be awarded in
a judgment; and in ascertaining the relief demanded it
should be noted that a prayer for relief is not essential to a
complaint in this state. Balle v. Moseley (1880), 13 S. C.
439. A failure to confine relief to the demand in the complaint is only on error of law, remediable by appeal and
doesn't render a default judgment void. McMahon v. Pugh
(1902), 62 S. C. 506, 509, 40 S. E. 961. On the other hand,
if an answer is in, one is entitled to all relief consistent with
the case as made, regardless of the relief as demanded in
the complaint. Ross v. Carroll (1890), 33 S. C. 202, 11 S. E.
760, state at page 204:
• . . While it is quite true, as stated in Pomeroy on
Remedies, section 580: "If there be no answer, the
relief granted cannot exceed that which the plaintiff
shall have demanded in his complaint," we are not
prepared to admit that if this rule is disregarded the
judgment would be thereby rendered void. It would be
an erroneous judgment, which might be corrected by
appeal, or perhaps by motion; but we do not see how
it would render the judgment void where, as in the
present case, the court unquestionably had jurisdiction
of the subject matter, and where it is not denied that the
court had acquired jurisdiction of the person against
whom the judgment was rendered....
Declaratory Judgment: South Carolina's old Section 660

was so limited in scope and so inclusive of what equity could
otherwise do, that it was seldom used. It's limitations included only construction of a "deed, will or written contract".
See Desportes v. Id. (1930), 157 S. C. 407, 154 S. E. 426, and
Ex. Parte Darby (1930), 157 S. C. 434, 154 S. E. 632.
A court can really go places now under the 1948 Act as
found in Code Sections 10-2001 to 10-2014.
One should read carefully Judge Lide's article in the South
Carolina Law Quarterly of September 1948.
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See Williams FurnitureCo. v. So. etc. Co., (1949), 216 S. C.
1, 56 S. E. 2d 576 and So. Ry. v. Order of Ry. Conductors
(1947), 210 S. C. 121, 41 S. E. 2d 774. This latter case, though
dealing with old Section 660, nevertheless covers some of the
basic principles relating to declaratory judgments and should
be integrated with the later Williams Co., supra, and also
with Dantzler v. Callison, Attorney General (1955), 227
S. C. 317, 88 S. E. 2d 65, which applies the Act of 1948, now
Sections 10-2001 et seq. and declares on page 321:
We are of the opinion that the Circuit Court was in
error in sustaining the demurrer and ordering the complaint dismissed. It is well settled that where the complaint seeking a Declaratory Judgment sets forth a
justiciable controversy it is not subject to demurrer on
the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.
"'Where a concrete issue is present, and there is a
definite assertion of legal rights and a positive legal
duty with respect thereto, which are denied by the
adverse party, there is a justiciable controversy calling
for the invocation of declaratory judgment action.'
[Cases Cited]
In passing on a demurrer in such cases, the court is
not concerned with whether the plaintiff is right in the
controversy, but is only concerned with whether he is
entitled to a declaration of rights with respect to the
matters alleged. "' The test of sufficiency of such a
complaint is not whether it shows that the plaintiff is
entitled to a declaration of rights in accordance with his

theory, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of
rights at all. Even though the plaintiff is on the wrong
side of a controversy, if he states the existence of a
controversy which should be settled by the court under
the Declaratory Judgment Law, he has stated a cause
of suit.'" Foster v. Foster, S. C., 83 S. E. (2d) 752, 753.
The use and determination of the demurrer
in actions
arising under the Declaratory Judgments Act is controlled by the same principles as apply in other cases.
Applying these well settled principles to the disposition
of this matter, we think that the complaint states a
justiciable controversy which can only be properly and
fully determined on a hearing on the merits ...

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss5/19

24

1959]

Whaley: Judgments
HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

145

The Williams Furniture Co. case, supra, points out instances when declaratory relief can be invoked and also
when not. The opinion states at page 7:
Section 6 of the Act is as follows: "The court may
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or
decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or
entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Declaratory relief
should not be accorded "to try a controversy by piecemeal, or to try particular issues without settling the entire controversy." Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Quarles, supra. Nor should such relief be granted when
the remedy is invoked merely to try issues or determine
the validity of defenses in pending cases. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Boyle Construction Co., Inc., et al.,
4 Cir., 123 F. (2d) 558. While declaratory relief will
not be refused, if otherwise appropriate, merely because
there is another remedy available or because of the
pendency of another suit, Employers' Liability Assurance
Corporationv. Ryan et al., 6 Cir., 109 F. (2d) 690, these
are factors which may be considered by the Court in
determining whether its discretion should be exercised
in favor of assuming jurisdiction. Southern Railway Co.
v. Order of Railway Conductors of America, 210 S. C.
121, 41 S. E. (2d) 774. "The wholesome purposes of
declaratory acts would be aborted by its use as an instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay
or to choose a forum." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle
Construction Co., supra [123 F. (2d) 564]

Since the Uniform Act, which like many other such Acts
got its best start in the Federal jurisdiction, it would be
wise to read the annotations under 28 USCA 400, and especially Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Harworth (1937), 81 L. Ed. 617.
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict: At common law
this was really a belated judgment on the pleadings. It would
only be used by a plaintiff where a defendant's answer was
legally insufficient, which also meant it could perform the
function of a belated demurrer. Ellison v. Greenville etc. Ry.
Co. (1913), 94 S. C. 425, 77 S. E. 723. In other words, a
plaintiff could have demurred, but didn't; he could then have
gotten judgment on the pleadings, but didn't; he waited until
a verdict came in against him; the common law gave him a
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third bite at the cherry, and allowed him to obtain judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Some jurisdictions by legislation or judicial sanction, permit the same choice by a defendant. South Carolina as yet has not done so.
In the Ellison case, supra, it was pointed out at page 431:
In Bowdre v.' Hampton, 6 Rich. 213, it is said that
judgment non obstante veredicto, can be rendered only
for a plaintiff. "A judgment upon the special findings
of a jury, but against their general verdict, is not really
judgment non obstante veredicto, although often inaccurately so-called. A motion for judgment non obsta4te
veredicto, is a motion for a judgment, on the pleadings
without regard to the verdict; but a motion for a judgment, on the special finding of the facts, notwithstanding
the general verdict, has no reference whatever to the
pleadings in the case, and proceeds upon the theory,
that the special finding of facts by the jury, is so inconsistent with their general verdict, that the former should
control the latter, and the Court should give judgment
accordingly." 11 Enc. P1. & Pr. 924-5.
South Carolina has Circuit Rule 79 which provides for
the same final result, i.e., judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, but it is in no way based on defective pleading,
but solely upon legal insufficiency of evidence. And it is a
condition precedent that one - either a plaintiff or a defendant - come within Circuit Court Rule 76 by making
a motion for a directed verdict and having it refused before
such party can get the benefit of Rule 79; and the motion is

limited to the grounds for a directed verdict. Standard
Warehouse Co. v. A. C. L. Ry. (1952), 222 S. C. 93, 71 S. E.
2d 893.
It will be noted that a motion for a new trial may be made
at the same time - but both motions must be made before
the term of court ends.
That judgment on the pleadings is still recognized for
either a plaintiff or a defendant in this State is clearly indicated in Page v. N. C. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1945), 207 S. C.
277, 35 S. E. 2d 716, and the Ellison case, supra, with no
later decision to the contrary, still gives to a plaintiff a right
to a belated judgment on the pleadings via the common law
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and Circuit Court
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rule 79 would have no application to such a judgment for
a plaintiff.
Arrest of Judgment: Circuit Court Rule 72 provides for
a motion in arrest of judgment in criminal cases and changes
the common law in that regard, in that the motion must be
noticed within two days after verdict; also, a motion for a
new trial may be noticed simultaneously. It does not appear
that the South Carolina Supreme Court has as yet had this
rule before it for interpretation. At common law in most
jurisdictions a motion for arrest of judgment waives the
right to make a motion for a new trial.
The old common law rule was used in a few criminal cases.
State v. Rafe (1899), 56 S. C. 379, 34 S. E. 660; State v.
Syphertt (1887), 27 S. C. 29, 2 S. E. 624. The common law
basic principle that such a motion must be based solely on defects in the record and that the record is what would be on file
in the clerk's office and would not include evidence, motions,
charge, or rulings at the trial would doubtless apply when
using Rule 72.
In the Syphertt case it was declared at page. 34:
... And first as to the motion in arrest of judgment.
Such a motion must be based upon some defect apparent
upon the record, and cannot be sustained simply upon
the ground of variance between the allegata and probata.
[Cases Cited]
It was further stated beginning at the bottom of page 34:
This, however, is more an objection to the sufficiency
of the evidence than to the sufficiency of the indictment.
It is like the case of the State v. Graham, supra, where,
under an indictment for obstructing a public landing,
and the proof being that the public road leading to the
landing was obstructed at a point about one hundred
yards from the landing, it was held that this constituted
no ground for a motion in arrest of judgment, but was
a good ground for a new trial. Or like the case of the

State v. Cookfield, supra, where the indictment was for
stealing a plough, and the evidence was that the article
stolen was a ploughshare, where a similar ruling was
made. Or like the case of the State v. Hamilton, supra,
where the indictment charged the goods stolen to be the
property of one person, when the proof showed them
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to be the property of another; it was held that while this
might have furnished a good ground for a motion for
a new trial, it afforded no ground for a motion in arrest
of judgment. It will be observed that in all three of these
cases the indictments were unexceptionable, and might
have been sustained under a certain state of the evidence.
And so here, under the assumption above alluded to,
the indictment, under certain proof, could have been sustained, and hence there is no ground for arrest of
judgment.
The old rule was used in South Carolina, but not often, in
civil cases. Brickman v. S. C. Ry. Co. (1876), 8 S. C. 173.
This motion appears to have almost left the legal scene;
probably because it worked in too narrow a groove and was
very technical. And Rule 72 also seems not to be much used
in criminal cases may be for a like reason.
Conclusive Effect of Judgments: In South Carolina one
cannot split a cause of action. Holcombe v. Garland, past,
of 162 S. C. There it was said at page 386:
"We therefore hold that for a single wrongful or
negligent act which injures both his person and his property an individual has but a single cause of action. In
this ruling we are supported by the case of W. & A. R.
Co. v. Atkins, 141 Ga., 747, 82 S. E., 139, where it was
held, in denying a motion for a rehearing, that the careless striking of the plaintiff's wagon, whereby he suffered damage both to his person and his property, constituted but a single tort, and that a settlement for the
property damage barred an action for damages on account of the personal injuries." Ga. Ry. & Power Co. v.
Endsley, 167 Ga., 439, 145 S. E., 851, 853, 62 A. L. R.,
256.
Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (1932), 165
S. C. 457, 164 S. E. 136, distinguishes a number of South
Carolina cases thus making it a very informative decision,
and shows how careful an attorney should be. It also tells
one at page 480:
In the matter before us, the legal wrong which Mitchell
suffered was the violation by the bank of his right to receive the proceeds of his potato crop which had come into
the bank's hands, amounting to about $18,000.00, and for
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this wrong he had a single indivisible cause of action
against the bank. When the bank sued him on his two
notes, amounting to about $9,000.00, he had the option to
interpose his claim as a defense to that suit or to demand
judgment against the bank, by way of counterclaim for
the amount owing him by it. He elected to set up his
claim as a defense only, and the jury applied it to the
payment of the notes held by the bank. The transaction
out of which the case at bar arises is the same transaction that Mitchell pleaded as a defense in the Federal
suit. He might, therefore, "have recovered in that action,
upon the same allegations and proofs which he there
made, the judgment which he now seeks, if he had prayed
for it." He did not do this, but attempted to split his
cause of action, and to use one portion of it for defense
in that suit and to reserve the remainder for offense in
a subsequent suit, which, under applicable principles,
could not be done. As said in the Miller Company case:
"If in the application of such principles the want of full
satisfaction accrues to the plaintiff, it is only because
of its [his] own actions, deliberately taken in choosing
the method of enforcing its [his] claims and demands."
A Cause of Action Cannot be Split: See the Holcombe case,
ante. A defendant cannot split a cause of action which he
could have set up as a counterclaim, thereby using part as
a set-off and getting a judgment for the excess over and above
a plaintiff's claim. If he uses only a part as a defense and
does not plead a counterclaim as to the whole, he forever
loses the excess over and above plaintiff's claim. Hence, a
defendant's attorney must always be careful of the choice he
makes when drawing an answer or a complaint. He cannot
use his client's claim partly as a shield first and later partly
as a sword.
At this point it should be noted that in South Carolina, as
hereinbefore pointed out, service of summons as to a nonresident by publication gives a court no jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment. Only the attached property can be used
toward paying the judgment and court costs. That exhausts
the jurisdiction of the court in such an in rem action. Any
balance remaining unpaid can be sued for later, as same would
not be merged in the first judgment, and hence there would
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be no bar. In this connection see Section 10-933 and annotations.
When is a Judgment a Bar? The well recognized rule is
that for a judgment to be a bar, there must be identity of
parties and of cause of action, or if there is a different cause
of action but identity of parties, then, if there is an identity
of issue in the two actions, only that issue will be res judicata.
This latter result, though often referred to as a bar, really
rests upon the doctrine of estoppel, whereas the doctrine of

res judicata rests upon a sound principle of public policy.
Antrum case, post. Also, where there is identity of parties and
of cause of action, then the judgment will in addition be conclusive of any issue "such as might have been raised affecting
the main issue." Johnston-Crews Co. v. Folk (1922), 118
S. C. 470, 111 S. E. 15.
See also Judge L. D. Lide's in South Carolina Law Quarterly, March 1952.
Griggs v. Griggs (1949), 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E. 2d 622, at
page 188, gives one a specific idea of what a judgment bars:
A judgment is "res judicata" so as to bar a claim in
a subsequent action only where rendered upon merits
upon same matters in issue and between same palties or
their privies, "matters in issue" being that matter upon
which plaintiff proceeds by his action and which defendant controverts by his pleadings. Rogers v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 275 Mich. 374, 266
N. W. 386, 388.
In Holcombe v. Garland& Denwiddie, Inc. (1931), 162 S.C.
379, 160 S.E. 881, an inconsistency of statement exists which
leaves one no definite rule. On page 388 it is said:
The distinction between the "cause of action" and "subject of the action" is clearly pointed out in Bliss on Code
Pleading (3d Ed.), 214: "The cause of action has been
described as being a legal wrong threatened or committed
against the complaining party; and the object is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal relief;
the subject of the action is clearly neither of these; it is

not the wrong which gives the plaintiff the right to ask
the interposition of the Court, nor is that which the
Court is asked to do for him, but it must be the matter
or thing differing both from the wrong and from the
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relief in regard to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has been done; and this ordinarily is the property, or the contract and its subject
matter, or other thing involved in the dispute."
While on page 389, the Court stated when referring with
approval to Ophuls & Hill v. Carolina Ie & Fuel Co. (1931),

160 S.C. 441,158 S. E. 824:
In this case was also quoted from Pomeroy's Remedies at page 800, these words: "It would, it seems to me,
be correct to say in all cases, legal or equitable, that the
'subject of the action', is the plaintiff's main primary
right which has been broken, and by means of which
breach a remedial right arises."
...

It is to be noted that the opinion at this latter stage tells
one that the "subject of the action" is not necessarily the
"property, or the contract and its subject matter, or other
thing [italics added] involved in the dispute", but it "is the
plaintiff's main primary right" [Italics added].
One is then told next what that primary right is; and it
is described as anything but "property, or the contract" "or
other thing involved in the dispute," the language of the Court
being:
Plaintiff's primary right was to use the highway in
safety; that primary right was invaded by defendant;
there arose a remedial right to plaintiff - the right to
recover damages for the injuries and damages to his
person and property. How? In one action. What effect
does his failure then to pursue his remedy for damages
in his first action have upon the second action, when the
plea of res adfudicata is invoked against the maintaining

of the second action?
Nowhere has the law applicable to the doctrine of res
adjudicata received more careful consideration and
clearer elucidation than in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Cothran in Johnston-Crews Co. v. Folk, 118 S. C., 470,
111 S. E., 15. From that opinion (page 482 of 118
S. C., 111 S. E., 15, 18) we take this: "As to the third
element as stated above [subject of the action]: In the
case of Hart v. Bates, 17 S. C., 35, the element is stated
in rather tabloid form thus: 'The precise point must have
been ruled.' This requires some amplification. If the
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identity of the parties and the identity of the causes of
action have been established, the former adjudication is
conclusive, not only of the precise issues raised and determined, but of such as might have been raised affecting
the main issue." [Italics added.]
It will thus be seen that the Court, after giving one an inconsistency as an attempted yardstick, levels off with a clearly
definite rule, namely, that a former judgment is conclusive,
and therefore a bar, where there is the "identity of parties
and identity of the causes of action". Identity of subject matter is not mentioned finally as a part of the legal yardstick
or as one of the conditions precedent to such conclusiveness
or bar.
There are cases in South Carolina that add "identity of
subject matter" as a requirement in the res judicata yardstick. Those decisions which use the phrase "identity of subject matter" use it entirely too loosely. It just happened that
in several of those decided cases there was identity of subject matter, as for instance in Nelson v. Parsons (1938), 187
S. C. 478, 198 S. E. 401, where the same proceeds of an insurance policy were involved in both suits.
The later case of Lafitte et al. v. Tucker (1950), 216 S. C.
201, 57 S. E. 2d 255, uses the phrase "identity of thing sued
for" instead of "subject matter", while the latest case, Antrum v. Hartsville Production Credit Ass'n. et al. (1949),
228 S. C. 201, 89 S. E. 2d 376 goes back to "identity of subject matter." It was therein held at page 209:
The doctrine of res judicata is a fundamental rule of
our jurisprudence and has been so often expounded that
no extended discussion of it is necessary here. It rests
upon the sound principle of public policy that after final
decision of a controversy by a court of competent jurisdiction the party against whom the decision was rendered, and those in privity with him, should not be permitted again to litigate, against the successful party or
those in privity with him, the issues that were there decided, 30 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sections 161, 165. While
the doctrine has been generally said to bar relitigation
not only of issues actually decided in the former proceeding, but also of such issues as could have been there presented for decision, the application of the defensive bar
to the latter rests, strictly speaking, upon the doctrine
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of estoppel rather than that of res judicata. Cf. Watson
v. Goldsmith, 205 S. C. 215, 31 S. E. (2d) 317; First
National Bank of Greenville v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 207 S. C. 15, 35 S. E. (2d) 47, 162 A. L. R.
1003.
"Before the defense of res judicata is made good, the
following elements must be shown: (1) The parties must
be the same or their privies; (2) the subject matter must
be the same; and (3) while generally the precise point
must be ruled, yet where the parties are the same or are
in privity the judgment is an absolute bar not only of
what was decided but of what might have been decided."
Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S. C. 377, 32 S. E. (2d) 147, 156.
See also Dunlap v. Travelers Ins. Co., 223, S. C. 150, 74
S. E. (2d) 828.
After all the laying down of a general rule can give rise to
dangerous precedents. In the last analysis one has to go back
to the basic rules of substantive law in order to definitely determine when a judgment will be a bar. Society has laid down
rules of public policy which, in turn, spell the individual's
personal as well as property rights, and of these rights judgments are finally determinative. As those rights vary, so can
the conclusiveness of judgments.
In 50 C. J. S. the last part of Section 718, dealing with
"identity of subject matter," calls attention to the fact that a
judgment will not be "conclusive where the question in the

second suit grows out of the same subject matter, but involves
a different question or claim with regard to it."
A 1944 case in Tennessee, Copeland v. Copeland, 177 S. W.
2d 555 says:
"A plea of res judicata is not available merely because the
subject matter of two suits is the same. The cause of action
in the two suits must be the same. Mr. Freeman expresses
the rule thus:
'As we have already seen, identity of subject matter is not
essential to estoppel by judgment. So in determining whether
causes of action are the same, the identity of the subject matter or of the transaction out of which they arise, is not a
controlling factor. The subject matter of an action must be
distinguished from the cause of action, since the subject matter of two actions may be the same and yet the causes of
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action may be entirely different. New rights in the same subject matter may intervene between the two actions.' Freeman
on Judgments, Fifth Edition, p. 1434.
As said in Marks v. Stevens (1918), 72 Okla. 186, 179
Pac. 7:
Care must-be taken also to distinguish betveen identity
of the subject-matter of litigation and identity of cause
of action, a distinction often overlooked. The subjectmatter of litigation may be the same, and yet the cause
of action may be entirely different.
The court called attention to the fact that this distinction
is particularly important where after-acquired rights in the
same property are involved, as such rights are never affected
by a former adjudication.
Where Ruling is Admittedly Wrong: Greenwood County v.
Watkins (1940), 196 S. C. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 545 wherein the
decree of Judge Gaston was adopted as the opinion of the Supreme Court, states the rule briefly on page 61:
It is well settled in this State that the rulings in a
case, even though admittedly they be wrong, become the
law of the case, and are res adjudicatabetween the parties. Jenkins v. Southern Railway Co., 145 S. C., 161,
143 S. E., 13.
Identity of Parties: This doesn't necessarily mean that the
identical persons or individuals must be involved in both suits.
It will include one who is in privity with a party, i.e. one who
legally steps in a party's shoes as representing the same legal
right in certain property, such as heir and ancestor. In 1949
Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S. C. 177, 51 S. E. 2d 622, used at page
188 the phrase "identity of quality [meaning legal quality]
in persons for or against whom claim is made" as a necessary
condition precedent to res judicata. This is just another way of
stating legal privity.
In that year the Griggs case brought on the scene again the
inconsistency that "there must be identity in thing sued for".
And thus the South Carolina cases leave one finally in doubt
as to what is the exact res judicata yardstick.
When is a Nonsuit a Bar? Since a judgment cannot be
pleaded in bar of a subsequent action unless it is a final judgment on the merits determining the rights in litigation in a
conclusive and definite manner, a nonsuit is usually not res
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judicata. There is, however, an exception as is shown by
Smith v. Ins. Co. (1942), 201 S. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 885, where
a plaintiff affirmatively proves facts which show as a matter
of law he has no case and that he couldn't succeed even if he
sued again. In that case the record showed that the plaintiff
had theretofore suffered an involuntary nonsuit in the Federal
Court and judgment was duly entered for the defendant.
The suit in the State Court was upon the same policy. The
opinion states:
At the trial of the present case, before the jury was
empaneled, the defendant moved before the presiding
Judge, the Honorable T. S. Sease, to dismiss the suit on
the ground that the cause of action is res adjudicata.
This motion was refused and the trial proceeded. The
defendant offered in evidence the record of the federal
Court and at the conclusion of the evidence moved for a
directed verdict on the ground that such judgment concluded all of the issues which were or might have been
raised, and that consequently it is res adjudicata of all
the matters and things involved in this action. This motion was overruled by the presiding Judge, and the jury

found a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,658.10 actual damages and $1,241.90 punitive damages. In its sixth, seventh, eighth, and fifteenth exceptions, the defendant contends that his Honor, the presiding Judge, was in error
in refusing such motions.
It should be noted that in this case the nonsuit amounted to a judgment upon the merits. In the case of Morrow
v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. Co., 84 S. C., 224, 66 S. E.,
186, 192, 19 Ann. Cas., 1009, it was said: "A nonsuit
is not usually a judgment upon the merits. It was originally given against the plaintiff when he introduced insufficient evidence to support a verdict, or when he refused or neglected to proceed to the trial of the cause,
after it had been put at issue. It is different, however,
where the plaintiff is nonsuited or a verdict is directed
because the evidence introduced by the plaintiff proves
affirmatively as a matter of law that he is not entitled to
recover. The difference is that in one instance the plaintiff fails to make out his case; in the other instance,
he proves affirmatively facts which as a matter of law
show that he is not entitled to recover."

Published by Scholar Commons, 1959

35

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 5 [1959], Art. 19
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. II

See, also, Hughes v. Southern Ry. Co., 92 S. C., 1, 75
S. E., 214; 34 C. J., 783, 893.
The judgment of the federal Court is entitled to the
same conclusiveness as is accorded the judgment of a
State tribunal. 34 C. J., 1160.
As to ImmaterialMatters: South Carolina would most probably follow what seems to be the general rule in this country
that res judicata or collateral estoppel does not apply to immaterial matters but extends, as held in House v. Lockwood
(1893), (N. Y.) 33 N. E. 595, only to the "material facts
which are in issue" and "to such as necessarily bear upon,
control, and are essential to, the adjudication made."
Is Conviction or Acquittal a Bar to a Civil Action? As to
the 1st part of the question, this State has only one case and
that is really an exception to the general rule that a conviction
is not a bar as the parties are not the same, but at most only
raises a prima facie presumption. Poston v. Home Ins. Co.
(1939), 191 S. C. 314, 4 S. E. 2d 261, held that a conviction
in that particular situation would be conclusive and therefore
a bar since the issue was whether the defendant stole his own
automobile, and it would be contrary to public policy, if he
were convicted, to allow him to recover theft insurance in a
subsequent civil suit and thereby profit by his own criminal
act.
One gathers from reading the decision that were it not for
the element of defendant's profiting from his own wrongdoing, the Supreme Court would have held that there would
be no bar but that a conviction would only be presumptive
evidence. This is substantiated by the fact that the Court
recognized the difference in requirements as to burden of
proof in civil and criminal cases, when it said that an acquittal would not be a bar.
In other words, as said in the Poston case, supra, at page
317:
The fundamental ground for the continuance, and of
the appeal, is the sub-servience of the public interest, and
that the interest of justice and of the public at large demands that the case should be continued until the trial of
the criminal charges in the Federal Court. Appellant disclaims any question of accommodation to itself. The conviction of respondent upon the charges would be conclusive against him here, because this Court would not
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look with favor upon the right of any party to profit by
his own criminal act.
But his acquittal would not end this litigation, because
whereas the government or the State might fail to prove
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict, yet the defense in the civil suit could prevail if
proven by the greater weight of the evidence. The proof
required differs in the two cases. Booth v. J. G. White
EngineeringCo., 101 S. C., 483, 86 S. E., 32.

Test as to Identity of Causes of Action: As to whether
there is identity of causes of action, South Carolina follows
the general rule that the best test is whether the same evidence would sustain both, although the two actions are different in form. Griggs v. Griggs (1949), 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.
2d 622, at page 185, states:
"In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if
it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same
cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is
to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain
both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same within the rule
that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions a judgment in one is
no bar to the maintenance of the other. It has been said
that this method is the best and most accurate test as to
whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties, and it has even been
designated as infallible." 30 A. Am. Jur., Sec. 365, at
page 407.
"The rule granting conclusiveness to a judgment in regard to issues of fact which could properly have been
determined in the action is limited to cases involving the

same cause of action. Where a second action is upon a
different claim, demand, or cause of action, the established rule is that the judgment in the first action operates as an estoppel only as to the points or question
actually litigated and determined, and not as to matters
not litigated in the former action, even though such matters might properly have been determined therein. Ac-
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cordingly, before the doctrine of res judicata is applied
in such cases, it should appear that the precise question
involved in the subsequent action was determined in the
former action. These rules prevail whether the judgment
is used in pleading as a technical estoppel, or is relied
on by way of evidence as conclusive per se." 30 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 180, at page 925.
Is a Judgment as to an Express Written Contract a Bar
to an Action in Quantum Meruit? A negative answer is abundantly supported by the authorities. Since a bar would depend on substantial identity of evidence, and since different
proofs are required in the two actions, South Carolina, following the Griggs case, supra, would undoubtedly follow the
general rule. Although in this State if one sues on express
contract one can't recover on quantum meruit, Gantt v. Morgan (1942), 199 S. C. 138, 18 S. E. 2d 672, still there is the
chance of one being allowed to amend his pleading if substantial harm would not thereby be done to one's adversary.
Also, there is the great probability that the two causes would
not be considered inconsistent and could be joined in the same
complaint so that the plaintiff could recover on whichever
was proved, though not on both. Stuckey v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. (1940), 195 S. C. 358, 11 S. E. 2d 391. However, this
case should be compared with the earlier case of Scott v. McIntosh (1932), 167 S. C. 372, 166 S. E. 345, which has not
been overruled and which states positively that a cause of
action on a lease cannot be joined with a cause of action on
quantum meruit.
Different Injuries from Same Wrongful Act: There is a
split of authority as to different injuries from the same wrongful act. In South Carolina if such act injures A's person and
his personal property, under Holcombe v. Garland, ante, there
would be but one cause of action with, however, two items of
damages, namely that affecting A and that affecting his property. If one item is left out, it cannot be sued for later. It has
become merged in the judgment.
But the more recent case of Floyd v. C. I. T. Corp. (1939),
191 S. C. 518, 5 S. E. 2d 299, makes one wonder whether
South Carolina has a general yardstick that can be safely
used or whether the usable rule depends on the particular
situation. In that case, the plaintiff sued for damages to
himself for assault, for trespass to his real property, and
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for loss of his wife's services. The Court held that all the
damages grew out of one incident or one act and therefore
there was but one cause of action. It is true that by so
holding the result would be that the cause could not be split
into two or even three suits, therefore, a multiplicty of suits
would be avoided.
As declared by the court in that case at page 522:
Has plaintiff split a single cause of action into three
causes of action? If so, his complaint is fatally defective
in that shape.
The rule is thus stated in Bliss on Code Pleading, page
155, Section 118, et seq.: "It is a rule that one cause of
action - as, one springing from a single contract cannot be so split as to authorize more than one action;
and the same rule would make it improper to so divide
a single cause of action, by separate statements in one
complaint, as to show more than one cause of action."

The same author says in the same section: "Logically,
every wrong furnishes itself a cause of action, but different wrongs may be so blended as to be called a single
wrong, as to furnish but a single cause of action, especially with reference to the policy of the law, which discourages a multiplicity of suits. A distinguished common-law Judge in New York says: 'All damages arising
from a single wrong, though at different times, make
but one cause of action; and all debts and demands already due by the same contract make one entire cause
of action.'" (Italics added.)
And further at page 524:
The question here involved has often been before the
Courts of this State, and others, and a review of the
authorities demonstrates that a clear preponderance of
them supports the rule that where the cause of action
grows out of one incident, it cannot be split to support
more than one.
"A single cause of action cannot be split either as to
relief demanded or grounds on which recovery is sought
**

*"

"Splitting a cause of action is the bringing of an
action for only a part of the cause of action." 1 C. J.
S., Actions, page 1306, § 102.
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"The rule against splitting causes of action applies
to causes of action arising ex delicto, the rule being that
a single wrong gives rise to but one cause of action, for
which but one action can be maintained, however numerous the elements or items of damage resulting therefrom
may be * * *." 1 C. J. S., Actions, page 1329, § 104.
But doesn't such a holding have its future pitfalls? No,
not if one keeps in mind the practical yardstick laid down in
the above case. For example, the statute of limitations as
to assault is two years. Section 10-145. But one can bring
an action for loss of one's wife's services or for trespass on
realty anytime within six years. Suppose Floyd had brought
his suit during the 4th year. Should any recovery for the

assault have been allowed under Section 10-145? Under the
rule in the Floyd case, it would have been allowed as one of
the items of damage flowing from one cause of action in turn
growing out of one incident or act, thus avoiding more than
one suit. So, in South Carolina the test is: do the damages
grow out of one incident or act or do they grow out of several separate and distinct incidents or acts arising at different
time intervals?
In distinguishing Matheson v. Am. Tel. Co. (1923), 125
S. C. 297, 118 S.E. 617, 618, the Floyd case stated:
In that case the complaint stated two causes of action;
one for trespass growing out of an incident which it is
alleged occurred in September, 1922, and one for abusive
language which it is alleged by the complaint to have occurred October 16, 1922. A motion was made to require
the plaintiff to state these causes of action separately.
The motion was refused. On appeal this order was reversed. The Court said: "In the appeal from the order
refusing the motions of the defendants, there are four
exceptions, but they raise the single point that the complaint contains tvo separate and distinct causes of action,
namely, a cause of action for injury and damage to the
premises and realty of plaintiff, and a cause of action
for injury and damage to the person of the plaintiff upon
another occasion than the trespass; and that for that reason the defendants were entitled to an order requiring
the plaintiff to amend the complaint, making it more definite and certain by separately stating two causes of action." (Italics added.)
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We have underscored the language of the opinion
which marks the difference between that case and this

with which we are now concrened....
Facts Subsequently Coming into Existence: Neither immaterial facts arising subsequent to the rendition of a judgment will affect the operation of such judgment as a bar,
nor will the discovery of new facts which are merely evidentiary. But subsequent new facts or events which create
a new legal situation or alter legal rights of litigants will
keep a judgment from being a bar or will preclude it from
operating as an estoppel, since such rights would not have
been in existence at the time of its rendition. Moseley v.
Welch, et al. (1923), 218 S. C. 242, 62 S. E. 2d 313. In that
case the rule was laid down as follows:
. . . The applicable rule is stated in 30 Am. Jur.,
Judgments, Section 206, page 943, as follows: "The
mere change of facts subsequent to the rendition of a
judgment does not necessarily affect the operation of
such judgment under the doctrine of res fudicaar. This
rule clearly prevails in the case of immaterial facts arising subsequent to the rendition of the judgment. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule of res judicata may not
be avoided by the discovery of new evidence bearing on a
fact or issue involved in the original action, as distinguished from a subsequent fact or event, which creates
a legal situation. However, where, after the rendition
of a judgment, subsequent events occur, creating a new
legal situation or altering the legal rights or relations of
the litigants, the judgment may thereby be precluded
from operating as an estoppel. In such case, the earlier
adjudication is not permitted to bar a new action to
vindicate rights subsequently acquired. In this connection, it has been declared that a judgment is not res
judicata as to rights which were not in existence at the
time of the rendition of the judgment."
Finality of Judgments: Under the cases in this State
heretofore cited, a judgment to be a bar must be final. It
also would follow that a final judgment is not necessarily
the last one in an action. A judgment that is conclusive of
any question in a case is final as to that question. This is
the general rule in America which South Carolina would
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doubtless follow. As of now this State hasn't directly passed
on this question.
Erroneous and Void Judgments: If a judgment is void,
it is open to collateral attack in any court, and it is void if
rendered by a court having no jurisdiction. If it is merely
erroneous because of some judicial error, it is only voidable
and is subject merely to direct attack in the trial court that
rendered it. Bradley v. Calhoun (1920), 116 S. C. 7, 106
S. E. 813. In that case it is declared at page 11:
.. . No one shall be personally bound until he has had
his day in Court; he must be cited to appear and afforded the opportunity to be heard.
"A judgment against a party not named in the camplaint nor any part of the record is void. We cannot presume that one who does not appear to have been a party
had his day in Court." Freeman on Judgments (2d Ed.)
§ 141.
"If the judgment or decree is silent upon the subject
of service of summons and the service shown by the
return upon the summons is not such as will give the
Court jurisdiction, no doubt the judgment is void."
Freeman on Judgments, § 133.
If the decrees are void and the parties not served,
that is a fatal defect without proof. If it is a voidable
judgment and a hidden infirmity which can only appear
by proof, in the latter case the infirmity cannot be
shown in a collateral manner, but only a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose. Turner v. Malone, 24

S. C., 404.
In some jurisdictions if a judgment is rendered pursuant
to fraud it is considered void, but in this State it is only
voidable and not subject to collateral attack. Bailey v. Cooley
(1929), 153 S. C. 78, 150 S. E. 473. As said at page 89:
There can be no controversy over the proposition that,
when a Court has complete jurisdiction of a cause and
renders judgment therein, its judgment cannot be collaterally attacked in another Court upon the ground of
fraud in the procurement of the judgment; the only
grounds of attack collaterally are that the Court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the parties
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or subject of the action and the assertion of the fact
nul tiel record....

Persons Affected by Judgments: Section 10-216 and Bryant
v. Smith (1938), 187 S. C. 453, 198 S. E. 20, relieves this
State of the problem of whether a husband, as a nominal
party to his wife's suit, is barred by the adjudication of
issues in her case, since he need no longer be such nominal
party. Her emancipation is now complete from the rigid
common law disabilities. She sues in her own right, just as
her husband can sue in his own right.
Joint tort-feasors can be sued jointly or severally and recovery may be had against all or each, but there can be only
one satisfaction. Nat/l Bank of Savannah v. So. Ry. Co. Div.
(1917), 107 S. C. 28, 91 S. E. 972. One is told at page 31:
The wrong act of one was the wrong act of both;
they acted together in concert, and by mutual assistance
aided each other in issuing the erroneous bills of lading.
The oil mill requested it. The railroad acceded to this
request, and issued the bills of lading as asked for. The
wrong done to the plaintiff was the joint act of the

defendant and the oil mill. Both were joint tort-feasors.
The plaintiff had the right to sue them separately and
to recover judgment against each. If the plaintiff had

prosecuted both actions to judgment, it could have done
so, and then elected which judgment it would collect,
but it could have only one satisfaction. The plaintiff
could have a judgment against either of the defendants
or both, as they were joint tort-feasors, but it could have
but one satisfaction for the wrong done. But when the
plaintiff obtained its judgment against the oil mill and
accepted satisfaction of it, as was done in this case,
then under the law the defendant was released from
all liability to the plaintiff. There was but a single tort,
and by the acceptance of the amount paid on the judgment obtained in the Federal Court and satisfying the
same the plaintiff was compensated for all damages it
sustained by reason of the wrongful issuance of the bills
of lading in the action.
At this point it should be noted that South Carolina stands
almost alone in judicially getting away from the old common law rule that in an acition against joint tort-feasors a jury
cannot apportion the damages. In this State a jury may
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apportion the damages and a satisfaction by one such wrongdoer of his share is not a satisfaction for any of the others.
As pointed out in Smith v. Singleton (1842), 2 McMul
184, at page 187:
It is true, we early departed from the English rule,
that in a joint action of trespass, the jury cannot sever
in their damages. The case of White v. McNeily, in 1784,
ruled that the jury in such a case might sever and apportion the damages according to the degree and nature
of the offence committed by each defendant. The wisdom of such departure is, I think, very questionable;
but it has been in practice ever since conformed to;
and we are now asked to give it a further extension, by
abolishing another well-settled principle, that in several
actions for a joint trespass, a recovery against one defendant, the satisfaction of it, and the payment of the

costs in the other cases, will bar any recovery against
the other defendants.
It is supposed that this principle, and the consequences
of a recovery in such a case as White v. MeNeily, cannot
stand together. For it is asked if a recovery against one
of several joint trespassers, and satisfaction, be a bar
to a recovery against the others, why would not the
payment of the damages found against any one of the
defendants in a joint action, bar the collection of the
damages found against the others? The answer is obvious - in several actions, the law supposes the jury to
find against any one, the entire damages sustained by
the plaintiff, and therefore, satisfaction in one is satisfaction in all. But in a joint action, when the damages
are apportioned, the aggregate of all the damages found
is the damage of the plaintiff; and hence satisfaction
by one, of his part, is not satisfaction for all, and of the
whole.
However, South Carolina's departure from the old common law rule has been strictly applied. It has been said it
"should be confined to the precise condition that gave it
birth." Hence in cases involving imputed liability, as for
example in the master and servant relationship, where they
are sued jointly, apportionment of actual damages is not
allowed, since the master is liable for the wrongful acts of
his servant while the latter is about the former's business.
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At the same time one finds a variation there which must
not be lost sight of, namely, that punitive damages may be
apportioned by the jury since the amount of such damages
depends largely upon "the pecuniary conditions of the defendants who are to be punished." Johnson v. A. C. L. Ry.
Co. et al. (1927), 142 S. C. 125, 156, 140 S. E. 443. This case
and Jenkins v. So. Ry. Co. (1924), 130 S. C. 180, 125 S. E.
912, both approve the ruling in the Smith case, supra, and
they are worthy of careful study and analysis, since both
exhaustively cover various aspects of this topic.
Privies- Who Are? As heretofore pointed out a judgment
is conclusive, not only as to a party, but as to any one in
legal privity with him. See also Cathcartv. Matthews (1916),
105 S. C. 329, 89 S. E. 1021. As said in that case at page 343:
Neither Cathcart's confinement in the asylum nor the
several adjudications of his lunacy is conclusive of the
fact of incapacity. The adjudications are not conclusive
even upon him or his privies, because he was not formally a party to either of them. They were ex parte. For
the same reason, they are not binding on defendants.
They are only prima facie evidence of the fact. Cath-

cart v. Sugenheimer, 18 S. C. 123. The adjudication of
July, 1876, that he was sane at that time stands on a
different footing, and is conclusive against him and his
privies, because he was a party to it. But, of course,
it would not preclude proof that he became insane after
that time.
Taking the South Carolina cases as to privies, no one case
has stated the different kind of privies but taking the cases
by and large South Carolina recognizes the four classifications mentioned in Womach v. City of St. Joseph (1907),
(No.) 100 S. W. 443, which are as follows:
1. Privies of blood, such as heir to his ancestor; 2. privies
in representation, as executor or administrator to their deceased testator or intestate; 3. privies in estate, as grantor
and grantee, lessor and lessee, assignor and assignee; 4.
privies in law, as tenant by curtesy (which doesn't exist in
South Carolina) or in dower. See State ex rel. Brown v.
C. & L. R. R. Co. (1879) 13 S. C. 290. In that case a court's
decree had determined that York County had the power to
issue certain railroad aid bonds. Did all persons purchasing
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such bonds become privies to the decree? Yes, said the court,
declaring at page 308:
. . . Parties acquiring an interest in the subject matter

of a suit after action commenced, from or under the
parties to such action, apart from the question of notice,
are privies, and it certainly cannot be contended that
there is a want of identity between the suits in equity
merely because persons who are privies under the one
are made parties to the other.
Parties such as can be bound include all who are directly
interested in the subject matter and had a right to make a
defense, or to contest the proceedings, to aduce testimony,
cross-examine witnesses and to appeal from a judgment.
Otherwise they are strangers and are not bound.
See Jenkins v. A. C. L. R. R. Co. (1911), 89 S. C. 408,
1 S. E. 1013, which, while it doesn't come within the basic
principle of res judicata, provides for conclusiveness of a
dgment because of another requirement of public policy.
In that case Justice Hydrick stated at page 412:
The question whether the Laurens judgment is a bar
to this action is one of interest and importance. In the
opinion of the Circuit Court, refusing a motion for a
new trial, in Logan v. R. Co., 82 S. C. 522, 64 S. E. 515,
the writer of this opinion investigated that question, and
undertook to show that the true ground upon which a
former judgment, in a case like this, should be allowed
to operate as a bar to a second action is not res judicata,
or technical estoppel, because the parties are not the
same, and there is no such privity between them as is
necessary for the application of that doctrine; but that
in such cases, on grounds of public policy, the principle
of estoppel should be expanded, so as to embrace within
the estoppel of a judgment, persons who are not, strictly
speaking, either parties or privies. It is rested upon the
wholesome principle which allows every litigant one
opportunity to try his case on the merits, but limits him,
in the interest of the public, to one such opportunity.
In Logan's case, and also in Rookard's case, 84 S. C.
190, 65 S. E. 1047, it is stated that a judgment on the
merits in favor of a lessee railroad company would bar
an action against the lessor for the same cause, because
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the liability of the lessor is predicated upon that of the
lessee. In other words, if the operating company - the

one that actually does the injury -

is held not to be

liable, it folows that the lessor, upon whom the law
imposes liability only for the acts of the lessee, cannot

be liable....
Somewhat on a like legal basis is Tiliman vs. Id (1912) 93
S. C. 281, 76 S. E. 559, where a father, although not a formal
party or in privity, was concluded by a decree because he had
submitted an affidavit making no claim on his behalf but
insisting on the claim of his father and mother to whom he
had conveyed all rights to his childrens' custody. As said
at page 284:
It is true that B. R. Tillman, Jr., was not a formal
party to that proceeding, but he submitted an affidavit
therein making no claim on his own behalf, and insistink
on the claim of his father and mother, to whom he had
solemnly conveyed all his rights of custody. It is clear
that by this action he became bound by the decree rendered in the former proceeding. But that decree expressly declared, in accordance with the well settled law,
that an application might be made for a change of custody "upon proof of such material change of conditions
as to make such a step proper.
There must be not only Verdict but Entry of Judgment
thereon to support Res Judicata,Except When? Durst v. So.
Ry. et al. (1931), 161 S. C. 498, 159 S. E. 844, at page 508,
states the rule:

If, upon the verdict of the jury judgment had been
properly entered up in favor of the defendant Williams
against the plaintiffs, and that judgment had not been interfered with by the lower Court or by this Court on the
appeal, the judgment, of course, would have been a bar
to the right of the plaintiffs to recover at any future time
against Williams on the same cause of action. Sparks v.
A. C. L. R. R., 109 S. C. 145, 95 S.E., 344.
But a judgment was not entered in favor of Williams,
and the general rule is, to which there are exceptions,
that the verdict of a jury, upon which no judgment has
been entered, is not sufficient upon which to base the plea
of res adjudicata. 34 C. J., 766. One of the recognized
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exceptions to this general rule, as pointed out by the ap-

pellants, seems to be where the parties have acquiesced
in the verdict or tacitly or expressly agreed to let it stand
in the place of a judgment. Id.
But further at page 509 it is pointed out:
Since all the parties to the action treated the verdict
in the first trial as a judgment, and allowed this Court to
decide the appeal upon the assumption that the attorneys
had followed the law and properly entered up judgments,
we are of the opinion that it is too late now for any of
the parties to object to the course which they themselves
pursued and misled this Court into pursuing....
Attention should be called to the fact that the Act of 1934
(now Section 7-5) allows for an appeal from a verdict without the necessity and expense of entering judgment thereon.
However, that Section would not appear to affect the rule laid
down in the Durstcase, supra.

Indemnitor and Indemnitee: This phase of res adjudicata
has its dificulties, as is shown by Gadsden v. Geo. E. Crafts
Co., et al (1918), 175 N. C. 358, 95 S. E. 610, which quotes
from Rookard v. Railway Co. (1909), 84 S. C. 190. The Gadsden case stated:

Speaking of the relation of principal and agent, or
naster and servant, and with special reference to the
question we are now discussing, the court said, by Justice
Hydrick in Rookard v. Railway Co., 84 S. C. 190, at page
191, 65 S. E. at page 1047, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) at page
436, 137 Am. St. Rep. 839: ... "A judgment on the merits

in favor of the agent is a bar to an action against the
principal for the same cause, because the principal's liability is predicated upon that of the agent. But a judg-

ment against the agent is not conclusive in an action
against the principal. A judgment against the principal
would not conclude the agent, unless the agent had been

vouched, or given notice and an opportunity to defend"
citing numerous authorities....
Beneficiaries of a Class Suit: Under Section 10-205 where
many have a common or general interest, one or more may sue
or defend for all as a convenience and also to prevent a probable failure of justice. Since it would often be impractical
to bring many persons before the court and as there would
-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss5/19

48

1959]

Whaley: Judgments
HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

169

be little, if any danger that the common interest of those
not made formal parties would suffer, a final judgment
is res judicata as to the rights of the entire class. Evans v.
Creech (1938), 187 S. C. 371, 197 S. E. 365. As said at
page 375:

The Code Commissioner has appended as a note to Section 406 [now Section 10-205], above quoted, the following:
"This section is discussed at length in Pom. Code Remedies, wherein it is said: 'The construction of this section
of the Code has been established by the courts, and the
rule is settled, as already stated, that, where the question
to be decided is one of common or general interest, to a
number of persons, the action may be brought by or
against one for all the others, event though the parties are
not so numerous that it would be impracticable to join
them all as actual plaintiffs or defendants; but, on the
other hand, when the parties are so very numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all into court, one may
sue or be sued for all the others, even though they have
no common or general interest in the questions at issue;
and the necessary facts to bring the case within one or
the other of these conditions must be averred.'"
In the case of Faberv. Faber, 76 S. C., 156, 56 S. E.,
677, the Court considered Section 140 (now Section 406)
of the Code, Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Gary,
for the Court, said (page 679) :
"The reason for this rule is thus stated in Smith v.
Swormstedt, 16 How., 288, 303, 14 L. Ed., 942: 'Where
the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their
rights and liabilities are so subject to change and fluctuations, by death or otherwise, that it would not be possible without very great inconvenience to make all of
them parties, and would oftentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity
permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent
the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same
as if all were before the court. The legal and equitable
rights and liabilities of all being before the Court by representation, and especially where the subject-matter of
the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger
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